We investigate the eect of Reformed Protestantism, relative to Catholicism, on preferences for leisure, and for redistribution and intervention in the economy. We use a Fuzzy Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design to exploit a historical quasi-experiment in Western Switzerland, where in the 16th century a hitherto homogeneous region was split and one part assigned to adopt Protestantism. We nd that Reformed Protestantism reduces referenda voting for more leisure by 12, for redistribution by 7, and for government intervention by 6 percentage points. These preferences translate into higher per capita income as well as greater income inequality.
1 Introduction [ The Apostle] Paul's maxim applies to everyone without qualication: 'if anyone will not work, let him not eat.' An unwillingness to work is a sign that one is not among the saved. The divergence of Puritanism from medieval Catholicism becomes clearly evident here ' (Max Weber, 1904) . Empirical results on the work ethic hypothesis by Cantoni [2010] , Becker and Woessmann [2009] and Spenkuch [2010] are mixed. Common to all three papers however is their focus on Germany, whose Protestants adhere mostly to the Lutheran variant of Protestantism, whereas Weber [1904] makes it clear that his famous hypothesis concerns explicitly not the Lutheran, but the Reformed variant, born with the Swiss rather than the German Reformation. As laid out in chapter II of his classic, he counts as Reformed the variants of Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism and Baptism.
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1 See especially pages 41, 42, 44, and 46. 2 A recent paper which deals more explicitly with the dierence between Reformed 2 This is the rst dimension in which we add to the existing literature: We focus specically on Switzerland with its Reformed variant of Protestantism.
In fact, we focus precisely on that region in the South West, which was rst converted to Calvinism and from where Calvinism later spread to other countries such as England or the New World.
Our second contribution to the economic literature on the work ethic hypothesis is that we use voting in referenda as direct measures of preferences.
Studies on the subject often examine the relationship between outcomes such as economic performance and religious aliation. But lacking data on attitudes, they cannot provide direct evidence on the work ethic channel posited by Weber.
But this paper goes beyond providing another evaluation of the work ethic hypothesis with a dierent sample and identication strategy: Based on an analysis of Weber [1904] as well as more recent work in the other social sciences, we show that Max Weber's classic includes hypotheses not only about work ethic, but also about political preferences, with far-ranging implications for the choice of political institutions and therewith also on economic outcomes like income inequality. In particular, this literature suggests that, relative to Roman Catholicism, Reformed Protestantism has curbed preferences for redistribution and for government intervention in the economy.
Switzerland is well suited to study how religion aects politics and the economy as it is one of the few countries exhibiting genuine within-country variation in religion. In the early modern period, religious unity was critical for political stability. Hence, most of the emerging European territorial and Lutheran Protestantism is Bai and Kung [2011] , which analyzes the impact of Protestantism in China.
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states enforced adherence to a single religion on what eventually became the national level. In Switzerland, however, cantons were the most important political unit, and consequently religious uniformity was enforced at the canton-level. Early in the 16th century, some cantons adopted the Reformation whereas others did not, which leaves us with both a treatment and control group.
Switzerland, however, exhibits not only religious variation; it is also a geographically and institutionally diverse country. As institutions and geography aect long-run economic performance, they potentially confound the results, and the decision to adopt the Reformation was indeed correlated with geography and institutions. Almost the entire rural and mountainous center of the Confederation remained Catholic. Among the urban Confederates, those ruled by patricians were more likely to remain Catholic whereas cities with a guild regime embraced Protestantism. To address this issue we focus on an institutionally and geographically homogeneous subset of the Confederation: the area in western Switzerland that is comprised of the present day cantons of Vaud and Fribourg.
In this setting the Reformation process led to exogenous variation in religion. Until 1476, the region was ruled by the duke of Savoy. Then, however, the Swiss defeated Burgundy and its ally Savoy in the Burgundy wars. The peace negotiations awarded the eastern half of the region to the city republic of Fribourg. When Protestant ideas spread in the 1520s the Fribourg magistrates decided to stay with the old faith, whereas Berne eventually adopted the new religion. By contrast, when Berne in 1536 nally conquered what is now the canton of Vaud it imposed Protestantism on its new subjects. Thereby we rule out self-selection into religious form. Our empirical results suggest that ceteris paribus in a Reformed Protestant electorate support for increasing leisure time will be about 12 percentage points lower than in a Catholic electorate, and support for redistribution and government intervention will be respectively 7 and 6 percentage points lower. These results are robust to varying our methodology along all relevant dimensions. There is some, albeit less strong evidence that these dierent preferences manifest themselves also in dierences in economic outcomes: In historically Protestant municipalities, average annual income per capita is found to be 4,120 CHF (about 1 standard deviation) higher and the Gini coecient of income inequality is 0.11 units (almost 2 standard deviations) higher.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces theoretical considerations and previous work on religion, politics and the economy.
Section 3 provides a brief account of the Swiss Reformation and presents the quasi-experiment. In Section 4 we introduce the data. Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 concludes. The Online Appendix provides more detailed information on the referenda used and a wide range of robustness checks. Studying 19th century Switzerland , Boppart et al. [2008] nd that interconfessional dierences in education did only exist in rural environments, but disappear in economically more advanced ones. Boppart et al. [2010] show that where Protestants are educationally more advanced than Catholics, they are so not only in reading but also in other elds, which they interpret as evidence against an education policy aimed primarily at facilitating the ability to read the bible. Instead they argue that compared to Catholics Protestants may have been more aware of the economic benets of education.
Religion and Political Preferences
But beyond suggesting to focus on a region characterized by predominantly Reformed Protestantism, the reading of Weber [1904] A second potential source of bias are institutions: Amongst the city republics in the Swiss Confederation, it turns out that all those with a guild regime became Protestant, whereas all patrician ones except for Berne remained Catholic. But guild regimes did also exhibit a higher degree of social mobility and so cities with a guild regime are likely to have diered already ex ante.
A nal concern stems from the fact that, since the Reformation was initially and during most of the territorial competition with Catholicism, a Germanspeaking movement 3 , its spread is largely restricted to the German-speaking parts of Switzerland, whereas the French-and Italian-speaking areas are predominantly Catholic. This might lead one to worry that dierences in preferences might at least partly be due to dierent cultural inuences from respectively the German-and the French-or Italian-speaking neighboring countries, which were found to matter for preferences in Bruegger et al.
[ Acemoglu et al. [2002] use as a proxy data on population density, frequently from Bairoch et al. [1988] . In our setup these cover only the largest towns, but fortunately Ammann [1937] has compiled data on the number of replaces per parish in the 15th century, based on parish visitations in the dioceses of Geneva and Lausanne.
These provide a useful proxy for population density and hence economic development at the time. Table 1 shows that there is no signicant dierence between our two areas in the number of replaces per parish.
Looking at cultural factors other than religion, both areas are Frenchspeaking, except for the Lake District and parts of the Sense district in the Catholic part, which are German-speaking. To ensure homogeneity with regard to language, we drop the German-speaking municipalities from the baseline sample.
Institutionally, both areas were subject territory of Burgundy and Savoy before the experiment. By implementing a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design, we can focus on those municipalities near the historical religious border and which are thus statistically identical in terms of the factors mentioned above. Indeed, Figure 2 conrms that while altitude is on average higher in the East, there is no signicance dierence nearby the border.
A Spatial Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
The Regression Discontinuity Design exploits the fact that the assignment of Protestantism in the 16th century and therefore also the "treatment" of present-day Protestantism change discontinuously at the historical religious border, whereas the confounding factors described above can be expected to change only continuously. This allows us to identify the causal eect of Protestantism as the discontinuous change in outcomes at this border, while controlling with sucient exibility for the eect correlated with the forcing variable, distance from the border per se.
9 The paper methodologically closest to ours is Bruegger et al. [2009] who analyze the impact of 9 For a recent summary of papers implementing such a design with various forcing variables, see for instance Imbens and Lemieux [2008] or Lee and Lemieux [2010] .
14 Latin languages (French, Italian or Romansh), relative to German, on work attitudes in Switzerland using distance to the language frontier as forcing variable.
As 
Data
To measure both "self-regarding" preferences about the choice between more leisure and more income, and "other-regarding" or "political" preferences about political issues like redistribution and government intervention in the economy, we use the fraction of citizens in each municipality voting for dierent policy proposals on these issues in dierent Swiss referenda.
The Swiss system of direct democracy, with its many referenda, is one of the rare cases that come close to the system of Pure Majority Rule often assumed in political economy models like in Persson and Tabellini [2002] :
Citizens vote directly on specic policies, choosing between pairs of alternatives, and there is an open agenda, as any suciently large group of citizens can demand a referendum on an issue. Since voting outcomes are directly put into policy, the voting data may be considered a better measure of preferences than mere survey data.
For all referenda held from 1980 onwards, the Swiss Federal Oce of Statistics provides voting data by municipality level on its website.
10 Given this list, we have researched the precise questions put to vote to decide which referenda can be classied as being about leisure, redistribution or intervention, and whether the referendum proposed more or less thereof.
Information on most referenda is publicly available on the website of the Swiss Federal Chancellery 11 , and additional information can be found in Appendix E of Kaufman and Waters [2004] as well as on the internet. In Eugster et al. [2011] , who analyze the eect of Switzerland's other main cultural divide, language, on respectively work attitudes and preferences for redistribution. While they use only a subset of the referenda considered here and use much wider bandwidths (25km and 50km), their approach is also a Regression Discontinuity Design and hence largely comparable. Since their rst-stage is somewhat larger than ours 13 , we compare IV coecients. Here the average eect of language on work attitudes, according to Bruegger et al. [2009] , Table 2 , is about 19 percentage points, and thus larger than our estimate of 12 percentage points. By contrast, estimates of the eect on preferences for redistribution lie at about 7-8 percentage points in both papers.
Main outcomes
13 0.84 according to Eugster et al. [2011] , Table A1 .
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The remaining columns of Table 3 are concerned with economic outcomes.
Columns ( Gini coecient is 0.07 points higher on the Protestant side of the border, which is signicant at the one percent level. As Figure 8 shows, the change at the border is indeed discontinuous. Table 4 presents Table 3 . The corresponding increase amounts to 0.9 percentage points in case of preferences for redistribution and 1.5 percentage points for preferences for intervention. The increase in income dierences is more pronounced. We obtain an estimate of 5,240 CHF at a bandwidth of 20km compared to 2,830 CHF in Table 3 .
The dierence in the Gini coecients remains at 0.07 for all bandwidths.
Robustness Checks
In the Online Appendix we subject the analysis to additional robustness checks, of which we provide a brief summary here. Some concern the technical implementation of our setup. We show that the results are robust with respect to using a triangular instead of a rectangular kernel, to using great-circle distance instead of walking distance, and to controlling separately for dierences in latitude and longitude. If in a Regression Discontinuity Design variables other than those aected by the assignment exhibit discontinuous changes at the threshold, this may question the validity of the setup. The Online Appendix investigates whether this applies to our case. We show that population density, the share of foreigner, the shared of married inhabitants, the share of males and the share of individuals without religious aliation do not exhibit a discontinuous change at the border.
The validity of the identication mechanism may be questioned because the assignment described above has led not only to dierences in present-day re- 
Conclusion
We have shown that in a 100% Reformed Protestant municipality, support for more leisure is predicted to be about 12, support for more redistribution 7 and support for intervention about 6 percentage points lower than in a 100% Roman Catholic municipality. When pondering the substantial importance of these dierences, one needs to keep in mind that the referenda are not just survey questions, but that the majority preference will be implemented as policy. But aggregation and implementation happen at the federal level. Thus Protestant and Catholic municipalities often vote
dierently, yet in all areas for which the decision power is at the federal level they end up with the same policy, the one which nds a majority in Switzerland as a whole. In this sense, the resulting dierences in economic outcomes are to be interpreted as lower bounds on the dierences we would see if the two areas had completely separate political systems.
The ndings on preferences for leisure lend empirical support to Max Weber's famous hypothesis of a "Protestant work ethic". Although the prior work on this issue by Becker and Woessmann [2009] and Cantoni [2010] does not use a direct measure of preferences, their ndings did suggest no role for a work ethic. In view of Max Weber's arguments, a plausible explanation for this dierence is that their focus was on Lutheran Protestantism, whereas we like Weber focus on Reformed Protestantism.
Going beyond the work ethic hypothesis, we show that Weber's classic can be seen to argue that the dierent religions will also lead to dierent political preferences, and our empirical results conrm this. They also conrm, in a quasi-experimental setting, the result in Alesina and Giuliano [2010] , whereby Protestantism leads to weaker and Catholicism to stronger 24 preferences for redistribution. It is important to stress that these preferences concern specically government-organized redistribution, but they need not mean less solidarity overall, since government-run redistribution may be substituted for by more private or church charity, as shown for instance in Hungerman [2005] or Gruber and Hungerman [2007] .
There is some suggestive evidence that the dierent preferences manifest themselves also in dierences in economic outcomes. This is not obvious a priori, because despite dierences in voting, municipalities end up with the same federal policies in many areas.
14 Furthermore, dierences in labor supply need not fully translate into dierences in actual work, if employees in both areas face the same labor demand and hours and wages are federally regulated or negotiated on a regional or federal level.
15 Thus Swiss sociologist Geser [2008] , in reference to Max Weber, argues that we should expect religious inuences to shine through strongest in politics and less so on economic issues, where market forces will enforce greater equalization.
Online Appendix nd some micro-level evidence that Protestants tend to retire later than Catholics, but these results as well are rather noisy and hence only suggestive.
On a more general level, our ndings show that culture does matter for political and economic outcomes. These preferences cannot be judged as good or bad. By contrast, it is only through such preferences that economic outcomes can be evaluated. The high persistence of dierences in preferences suggests that if economic policy is to maximize social welfare, it will typically have to take preferences into account and as given. Finally, our results underline the benets of a federal system, in which regions with dierent cultural backgrounds are able at least in some areas to choose dierent policies. Lake Geneva is in the South and Lake Neuchatel in the North.
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Figure 2: Average altitude in meters above sea level conditional on walking distance to the border. Bin width 5km. T is an indicator for whether a municipality is on the historically Protestant side of the border; Distance is walking distance to the closest border point in km. In column (1) bandwidth in km is chosen optimally following Imbens and Kalyanaraman [forthcoming] . Columns (2) shows the bandwidth used for our main outcomes, and (3) and (4) use alternative bandwidths of respectively 10km and 20km. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01. T is an indicator for whether a municipality is on the historically Protestant side of the border; Distance is walking distance to the closest border point in km; Bandwidth in km is chosen optimally following Imbens and Kalyanaraman [forthcoming] . Preferences in columns (1), (2) and (3) are averages of the respective referenda listed in Appendix Table 1 . Column (4) uses the average across the years 1980-2000 of each municipality's pre-tax income divided by the number of tax payers. Column (5) uses the Gini coecient of income inequality, taken from Ecoplan [2004] . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01. 
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